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Cinema, Cliché, and Thought Outside Itself 
 
Tyler Munroe Parks 
University of Edinburgh 
 
In Deleuze’s Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, the cliché appears as merely 
one concern in a web of others, and here I would like to argue for its significance in distinguishing the nature of 
the two regimes of thought associated with the movement-image and the time-image. While Deleuze contends 
that artists and filmmakers must struggle with the cliché, it seems to me that he does not stress enough that 
filmmakers often make vital use of the clichés of continuity and spatio-temporal orientation that have been 
developed in the medium’s short history. It is in making use of these clichés, though not for the purpose of 
parody alone, that filmmakers are able to most forcefully make visible the limits that clichés set on cinematic 
thought, and the points at which thought moves outside these limits. In order to make my arguments I will 
consider the filmic style of Yasujiro Ozu, and Wong Kar-wai’s In the Mood for Love. 
In an interview that appeared in Le Monde shortly after the publication of Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image in 1983, Gilles Deleuze claimed that the argument he puts forward in the book is 
simple: “The great auteurs of film are thinking, thought exists in their work, and making a film is 
creative, living thought” (“Portrait” 220). One can indeed see The Movement-Image and the book that 
followed it in 1985, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, as attempts to distinguish two distinct forms of 
thought made operable through two regimes of the cinematic image, that of the movement-image and 
that of the time-image. However, if the relationship between cinema and thought is central to 
Deleuze’s project in these books, as I believe it is, it is not always clear how certain arguments that 
seem to be peripheral to this relationship should be related to it. One such concept is that of the cliché, 
which appears in the final chapter of The Movement-Image and is returned to in the opening chapter 
of The Time-Image. As we might suspect from its placement in Deleuze’s texts—at the point where 
one regime gives way to the other—the cliché, I argue, plays an important role in understanding the 
distinction between time-image and movement-image cinema.  
Nevertheless, in Deleuze’s texts, the cliché appears as merely one concern in a web of others, 
and here I would like to argue for its significance in distinguishing the nature of the thought formed in 
the two regimes. While Deleuze contends that artists and filmmakers must struggle with the cliché, it 
seems to me that he does not stress enough that filmmakers often make vital use of the clichés of 
continuity and spatio-temporal orientation that have been developed in the medium’s short history. It 
is in making use of these clichés, though not for the purpose of parody alone, that filmmakers are able 
to most forcefully make visible the limits that clichés set on cinematic thought, and the points at which 
thought moves outside these limits. 
 
The Regime of the Movement-Image 
FORUM | ISSUE 18 Tyler Munroe Parks 2 
 
 
 
 
First, it is necessary to describe the ways in which the regime of the movement-image is 
constituted. In referring to the regime of the movement-image Deleuze identifies a particular system 
of thinking with cinematic images and sounds. It is more useful to distinguish two regimes of 
audiovisual thought, rather than simply two distinct types of image, because in most cases, it is 
difficult to say whether an image is a time-image or a movement-image without knowing how it 
relates to the images with which it is linked. Thought in the regime of the movement-image is 
manifested through two processes: differentiation and specification (Cinema 2 28-29). Differentiation 
is the process through which “the whole constantly divides depending on the objects, and combines 
the objects into a whole” (28). There is a mutual movement by way of which the images externalise 
and differentiate the aspects of a whole and are internalised in this whole, which is open in a 
nonlocalisable dimension—in thought. The sequences of a film are integrated into a whole, as in a 
person’s internal monologue, and this whole is differentiated into sequences that establish the same 
world between them. Connections are fixed between people, things, and the times and spaces in which 
they exist (Cinema 1 100). 
Specification, on the other hand, consists of constructing rational intervals of movement, and 
it is related to the filmmaker’s development of relations of commensurability and continuity between 
disparate sequences. There are images specified as perception-images, which present a state of things, 
and action-images, which present reactions that alter a perceived state of things. Affection-images 
occupy the interval between the two, and appear when sensations, neither captured through 
perception nor remaining wholly outside of consciousness, are absorbed by the body such that a 
change is registered directly rather than through the intermediary of the bodies onscreen. Often, these 
are images of the human face, expressing qualities (wonder or surprise) or powers (desire increasing, 
or transforming into disappointment). These are the three primary types of images that make up the 
sensory-motor schema.  
Deleuze’s concept of the sensory-motor schema comes from Henri Bergson’s Matter and 
Memory, and it has two main aspects. First, living beings “allow to pass through them, so to speak, 
those external influences which are indifferent to them; the others isolated, become ‘perceptions’ by 
their very isolation” (Bergson 36). Our representations of matter offer us, therefore, a measure of our 
possible action upon the bodies we encounter, since these images result from “the discarding of what 
has no interest for our needs, or more generally, for our functions” (38). Deleuze describes this 
subtractive movement of perception as an act of framing, and as we will see, it is this discarding of 
what seems of no interest to us that informs his conception of the cliché.  The second aspect of the 
living image’s conscious perception is that a horizon forms around the body, allowing the body to 
organise a response to the perception received. Bergson argues that this occurs because “as my body 
moves in space, all the other images vary, while that image, my body, remains invariable. I must 
therefore, make it a center, to which I refer all other images” (46). In this way, the body prepares itself 
to react to the stimulus it has received. The subtractive nature of perception allows us to form images 
that frame what is of interest to us such that it can be consciously recognised, and a horizon is thereby 
formed within which the relationships between perceptions and actions are clearly determined. 
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Cliché, Continuity, and the World 
The final chapter of The Movement-Image describes the crisis of the action-image, that image 
most often associated with cinematic realism. According to Deleuze, such realism is a result of spatio-
temporally fixed milieux and modes of behaviour that reveal or alter a state of things: “The action-
image is the relation between the two and all the varieties of this relation” (Cinema 1 145). The 
consciousness of clichés, he argues, is one of five characteristics that make this crisis apparent without 
themselves being enough to constitute a new type of image. Clichés, Deleuze argues, have not only 
come to proliferate in an exterior world full of photographic, cinematic, and televisual images, but 
constitute our interior world, “so that everyone possesses only psychic clichés by which he thinks and 
feels, is thought and is felt, being himself a cliché among the others in the world which surrounds him” 
(Cinema 1 213). Clichés hold things together when people are no longer united by collective causes, 
and thus Deleuze links the crisis of the action-image, dominant in Hollywood filmmaking practice, 
with that of the American Dream, and claims responses to this crisis can be found in the work of 
directors like Martin Scorsese and Robert Altman.  
The cliché appears in the places left vacant by “the healthiest illusions”, illusions that allow us 
to believe in a situation that could give rise to an action capable of modifying it, or actions through 
which a situation reveals itself (Cinema 1 211). Such illusions were already shattered in Europe after 
World War II; therefore, Deleuze argues, filmmaking strategies that extended the intervals between 
action and reaction began to appear earlier there. It is also true, however, that various filmmakers—
notably Orson Welles, Jean Renoir, and Yasujiro Ozu—had already moved outside the regime of the 
movement-image before and during the war. What may have motivated Ozu’s move away from the 
movement-image is of particular interest with regard to Deleuze’s claims that the regime of the time-
image is dependent upon the breakdown of the sensory-motor schema.  
Noël Burch argues, in a text that Deleuze cites a number of times in the Cinema books, that it 
is as a result of a fundamentally Japanese perspective that Ozu rejects the two key principles of the 
“Western” mode of representation developed in Hollywood.  This rejection is, according to Burch, a 
sign of dissent from the anthropocentric worldview inherent in the Western mode of cinematic 
representation, which is centred upon human beings and their actions. The two principles 
“symbolically challenged” by Ozu, are those of continuity and the inclusion of the viewer in the 
diegesis “as a transparent relay in the communion between two characters” (Burch 159). According to 
Burch, already in That Night’s Wife (1930), a silent film, Ozu had prominently incorporated the two 
aspects of his practice that break with these principles. These aspects are “bad” eyeline matches 
between shots and the deployment of cutaway still lifes, which Burch calls pillow-shots. He gives them 
this name because he judges them loosely analogous to pillow-words in classical Japanese poetry, 
which usually occupy a short five-syllable line and modify the first word in the following line. 
Sometimes though, as Burch notes, their meaning is unclear, in which case they function rhetorically 
to elevate the tone, and, to some degree, as images. Mismatched eyelines and pillow-shots break up 
the diegetic flow, the first since they do not assure the spectator’s sense of orientation to diegetic 
space, and pillow-shots because they are images in which no human beings are present, and are not 
attributable to the vision, or interests, of any character. 
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The appearance of hiatuses in the diegetic flow introduces breaks that cannot be assimilated 
into a sensory-motor schema. The still lifes of Ozu are optical images that cannot be assigned a 
position in relation to the interval linking perception and action. We absorb them, so to speak, without 
knowing what they oblige us to take from them. In fact, Ozu uses them in many different ways, and 
they generally reference spaces where the characters are, have just been, or will shortly arrive. 
Nevertheless, as Burch argues, the “space from which these references are made is invariably 
presented as outside the diegesis, as a pictorial space on another plane of ‘reality as it were’” (161). 
This space is also outside of any reference to a sensory-motor schema that would normalise the 
aberrant movement it presents by relating it to what takes place among the characters.  
 
Sensory-Motor Images and Pure Optical Images 
Deleuze claims that the sensory-motor image of things is a cliché. In it “we perceive only […] 
what it is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interests, ideological beliefs and 
psychological demands. We therefore normally perceive only clichés” (Cinema 2 19-20). A cliché is an 
image that presupposes a particular link between what is seen or heard, and what will then be felt, 
thought, or done. It is not a matter of clichés penetrating into our minds and hearts from outside, but 
of a cliché-making activity internal to our faculty of perception. With regard to cinema, this link 
between perception and action pertains to the activity of both spectators and the fictional characters 
of narrative films. In movement-image cinema, characters react to situations, perceive what it is in 
their interest to do in a situation, quickly or gradually, and do it. The spectators in turn identify to 
varying degrees with the agents on screen, and with relative ease, they grasp (though sometimes 
retrospectively) that which was in the image to be taken hold of, the pieces crucial to the 
understanding of the whole. 
How are we then to understand Deleuze’s enthusiasm for so many films constructed 
according to the regime of the movement-image? He in fact claims that neither of the two regimes of 
cinema is superior to the other (Cinema 1 259). Certainly, a great amount of invention went into 
making the images on screen accord with the system of perception native to us. This is the function of 
what Burch calls the Western mode of representation: to ensure a continuity of the narrative and the 
filmic world across cuts, and to situate the spectator such that the thought she internalises will not be 
interrupted by spatial or temporal disorientation. However, Deleuze suggests three reasons for the 
need to turn away from the regime of the movement-image. The first is the mediocrity of the majority 
of productions, and the second its degeneration into manipulation and propaganda.  The third reason 
Deleuze cites is the need to explore whether or not there is a type of thought that is essentially 
cinematic, which would not be dependent upon the laws of the sensory-motor schema (160). It is this 
last question that is bound up with the cliché. 
Deleuze turns to Antonin Artaud to formulate an essentially cinematic type of thinking. 
Artaud initially saw great possibilities in the cinema, but he eventually turned away from it, ceasing to 
believe that it could go beyond the clear thought developed in the regime of the movement-image. In 
“Witchcraft and the Cinema” (1927), he argues, “Clear thought is not enough. It allocates a world 
which has been utterly consumed. What is clear is what is immediately accessible, but what is 
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immediately accessible is the mere skin of life” (66). The thought formed by the regime of the 
movement-image is a particular kind of what Deleuze calls “spiritual automatism”. He adopts this 
term from Spinoza, who formulated it in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. In relation to 
the regime of the movement-image, Deleuze uses it to designate the process wherein a totality that is 
differentiated and divided up in each shot at the same time integrates the disparate images into a 
totality open in a nonlocalisable dimension. The whole is a duration, a continuum of time, open at 
both ends, produced in the thought on the screen that the spectator interiorises. Movement-images 
are clichés because they always refer back to intervals of movement that make the action they 
represent seem to obey the laws of a fixed space-time. It is for this reason that the potential power of 
modern cinema lies in its moving outside of this schema, so that perceptions are not always motivated 
by the actions that will arise in response to them. As in Ozu, this leads us into situations in which we 
see without knowing what it is we are supposed to be seeing. His still lifes, though still invested in 
human affairs, move toward a horizon outside the sensory-motor connections by which those affairs 
are given form. 
Deleuze draws an important distinction between sensory-motor images and pure optical 
images. In the case of the sensory-motor image, we automatically recognise that which interests us. To 
illustrate his point, Deleuze writes that the cow sees grass in general, as that which it can eat. The pure 
optical image, on the other hand, presents us with specific features of a particular field of grass, and 
we are unable to take in everything or reduce the image to that element which extends directly into 
action. The pure optical image, in other words, offers a different kind of description. The relationship 
between image and reception is not organic, as it is in the sensory-motor schema, where a chair is 
made for people to sit on and grass is meant to be eaten; rather, the pure optical image is inorganic or 
“physical-geometrical.” Pure optical images “bring the thing each time to an essential singularity, and 
describe the inexhaustible, endlessly referring to other descriptions” (Cinema 2 43). The same image 
could be described in any number of ways, and these descriptions would multiply if we consider the 
descriptions that could be made of the other images with which it is linked. Therefore, even though it 
may seem that the sensory-motor image is richer, since we know what we are meant to see in it, it is 
actually the pure optical image that is richer because we are unable to subtract from it that which has 
no bearing on our interests.  
 
Still Lifes and Empty Spaces 
According to Deleuze, in order to combat the cliché, a film must do more than disturb the 
sensory-motor links within and between images. Films must introduce a new type of image that opens 
onto forces not manifested through the regime of the movement-image. It is not that the movement-
image disappears with the appearance of the time-image, but that it comes to exist as “the first 
dimension of an image that never stops growing in dimensions” (Cinema 2 21). These dimensions are 
not spatial; they are rather new powers of the image, powers that do not belong to world images—
which make up the expressive material of perception-, affection-, and action-images in the regime of 
the movement-image—but constitute cinematic images that operate to varying degree outside of their 
reference to a pre-existing world. Deleuze argues that it is in coming into relation with the forces 
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released by these new images that the optical sound image can escape from a world of clichés (22). 
The three new types of image detailed by Deleuze are chronosigns, lectosigns, and noosigns: the time-
image, the readable image, and the thinking image. The last of these is of principle interest in this 
paper, but a brief explanation of the chronosign is necessary to understand the concept of the noosign. 
The still lifes of Ozu are time-images, or chronosigns, according to Deleuze. He differentiates 
these from shots of empty spaces and landscapes, which Burch had grouped with them under the 
name pillow-shots, while acknowledging that these images share many functions and transition 
imperceptibly into each other (Cinema 2 16). For example, in Ozu’s work, the empty space or 
landscape, like the still life, usually exceeds its typical function as an establishing shot, which orients 
the spectator to the space-time in which the characters act. The question that Deleuze poses is 
whether some of these pillow-shots go beyond simply disturbing sensory-motor relations, or, in 
Burch’s terms, whether they go beyond introducing an effect of hiatus that suspends the diegetic flow 
and become directly temporal. Deleuze argues that Ozu’s still lifes are the correlate of the optical 
images presented by empty spaces and landscapes. “An empty space”, he writes, “owes its importance 
above all to the absence of a possible content, whilst the still life is defined by the presence and 
composition of objects which are wrapped up in themselves or become their own container” (Cinema 
2 16). We can take as an example, as Deleuze does, the famous shot of the vase in Late Spring (1949), 
which is interpolated into the nocturnal conversation between Noriko (Setsuko Hara) and her father, 
Professor Somiya (Chishu Ryu), as they lie in their beds with the lights out in an inn in Kyoto. This 
image, according to Deleuze, is an image of fullness rather than emptiness, a distinction, he notes, that 
accords with the nuanced relation between these two terms in Chinese and Japanese thought. 
Whether empty space or still life, the image disrupts the sensory-motor links, but it is in becoming 
“full” that it constitutes a kind of thinking outside of what Artaud called clear thought. 
According to Deleuze, it is at the point at which the cinematic image most closely resembles 
the photograph that it grows most radically distinct from it. Where all movement is absent within the 
image, the image, through its duration, realizes a temporal movement directly. In the case of the shot 
of the vase, it is the image’s duration that first strikes us, guiding us nowhere, distending the moment 
of the present (Cinema 1 16). It brings out a direct image of transformation in which movement is 
temporal, in which time becomes the measure of movement. Such is Deleuze’s argument when he 
claims that the vase in Late Spring is an image of change presented through the pure form of that 
which never changes, but in which all change takes place: time. For, the first shot of the vase comes 
between Noriko’s tentative smile, after finding that her father has fallen asleep while she was talking 
to him, and her eyes filling with tears. A qualitative change occurs in the temporal movement of the 
image. The transformation occurs within the interval, rather than in the images of the characters 
through which the largely eventless diegesis is developed. The event arrives without being grounded in 
the image, but as the image itself. Nevertheless, for this image to constitute such a change, it must 
stand in relation to the images to which it is linked. It is part of a regime, or system, of cinematic 
thought. 
 
Learning to See in Hong Kong 
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Burch argues that Ozu’s films after World War II, including Late Spring, suffer from an 
academicism that results from the very stylistic traits—pillow-shots, 180-degree matches, mismatched 
eyelines—that had made his earlier films radical (Burch 182-183). He appears to think that they 
ossified into clichés in ceasing to play a dynamic formal role and becoming merely signifiers of an 
“Ozu film.” I disagree with him, and think rather that they continue to be a part of an inventive style of 
cinematic thought that limits narrative and technical possibilities in order to combine them into 
endless permutations. The existence of clichés is necessary for such a practice, since this practice 
allows for clichés to be undermined, not through an ironic treatment or parody, but by allowing 
difference to emerge between images that appear similar, and that we might otherwise be tempted to 
associate with one another. It is the closeness, or interplay, of the image and the cliché that it eludes 
that give us a glimpse of the false horizons that clichés establish.   
This perspective does not seem to me totally incompatible with that put forward by Deleuze 
and Guattari in What Is Philosophy?, but it is nevertheless distinct from it. There, Deleuze and 
Guattari claim, “Artists struggle less against chaos (that, in a certain manner, all their wishes summon 
forth) than against the ‘clichés” of opinion’” (204). An important struggle for contemporary 
filmmaking is to keep the cliché close enough so that it is revealed as such. If filmmakers need to court 
chaos to do so, it is that chaos described by Deleuze in The Time-Image: the indiscernibility of the true 
and the false, the imaginary and the real. Narrative films are of course fictional, but it is those types of 
fiction that accord with no model of truth, instead playing on the clichés that maintain such a model, 
that allow the spectator to get a glimpse of the limits within which clichés position thought. 
Some of the preceding claims can be clarified with a consideration of Wong Kar-wai’s In the 
Mood for Love (2000), since it plays on the clichés of continuity and the primacy of actions and 
responses in a number of interesting ways. As commentators such as Rey Chow and Giuliana Bruno 
have noted, we often know that time has passed in the film only because Su Li-zhen (Maggie Cheung) 
has changed her cheongsam, her dress. These costume changes often tell us, for instance, that an 
image we had expected to belong to the same evening as the previous image actually belongs to 
another evening altogether. Sometimes it is even difficult to know whether we have moved into the 
past or the future or if an image belongs to the diegetic reality, or the fantasy life of one of the 
characters. This is the case, for instance, when Mo-wan and Li-zhen first go out to dinner together and 
each discovers that the other is aware that their respective spouses are having an affair. As the 
sequence in the restaurant comes to a close, a Nat King Cole song, “Te quiero dijiste (Magic Is the 
Moonlight)”, begins to play. There is a cut to an image of the two walking on the street, away from the 
camera, and we can see that Li-zhen is wearing a different dress. The music continues to play until this 
shot comes to an end and then Wong cuts to another meeting between the two, in which Li-zhen wears 
yet another cheongsam. 
 Usually, such a musical bridge would assure us that a period of time is passing in which 
nothing important to our understanding of the relations between characters is happening, and if 
something is happening during those intervals, we will generally be told about it later. In the Mood for 
Love does not at all assure us that we are seeing the events most important to understanding the 
relationship between Mo-wan and Li-zhen. The establishment of an intimacy between the two is 
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dependent upon sequences that bring together music and slow-motion to create an affective density 
that bleeds into the rest of the film. These are the sequences of the two passing on the street, or on the 
steps to the noodle bar where they both go to eat alone, scenes accompanied by Shigeru Umebayashi’s 
waltz, “Yumeji’s Theme.” While their not leaving their spouses and getting together is a sort of non-
event captured in snippets of conversation, these autonomous image/music sequences present 
directly the melancholy event of a love that fails to materialise. Rather than a sensory-motor 
representation that develops the event through the rearrangement of bodies on screen, we are 
presented directly with an affective event that resists any final description. 
Even when the two do embrace, after Mo-wan has decided to leave for Singapore, it is in a 
practice farewell, in which they pretend to be their future selves. That Li-zhen breaks into tears only 
serves to highlight the disjunction between the situation and the response. The simulacrum, the 
rehearsal, induces a real emotional response and becomes the event that expresses what has until that 
point remained unseen. This is already the case when the two pretend to be their spouses in order to 
discover how their affair began, and Li-zhen is taken aback when Mo-wan, acting as her husband, 
makes the first move. The signs of emotion the two exhibit make it evident that a real event has taken 
place, but the scene is also a little fiction, given life by two performers acting as characters they are not 
themselves playing. But Wong, of course, often makes the relations between chronological events 
perceptible. Even if we are not sure what happens between the images, in the interstices of the film, 
we know that after the two meet at the restaurant their friendship, or perhaps romance, progresses, 
and that eventually Mo-wan falls in love, realises Li-zhen will not leave her husband, and moves to 
Singapore. It is in the play between sensory-motor relations and what operates outside them that the 
clichés that ensure a “realistic” continuity are revealed to us.  
In a famous passage from Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche lays out the tasks for which we 
require educators—learning to see, think, speak and write. “Learning to see”, he writes, means 
“habituating the eye to repose, to patience, to letting things come to it; learning to defer 
judgment…not to react immediately to a stimulus, but to have the restraining, stock-taking instincts in 
one’s control” (76). The power of the regime of the time-image is precisely that it introduces a thought 
that is carried outside of the sensory-motor schema, leaving us in the position of learning to see 
without reacting automatically to what we perceive. In In the Mood for Love, Wong, like Ozu, does not 
cease to make connections between characters or to develop situations, but these developments tend 
to occur by way of dialogue, while the image often manifests the power of a vision that is not subject to 
its relation to the characters in the narrative. Such a vision can itself constitute an event of 
transformation and can shatter the continuity of clear thought, its processes of integrating the 
difference introduced by each image into the self-sameness of a totality. It is the presence of such an 
unspecified difference, a glimpse of the world outside its ordering by human thought, that allows us to 
see without recourse to the clichés with which perception reduces the world to its potential human 
interests. Though, as Nietzsche argues, it is in our interests to learn to do so.  
 
FORUM | ISSUE 18 Tyler Munroe Parks 9 
 
 
 
 
Works Cited 
Artaud, Antonin. “Witchcraft and the Cinema”. Collected Works, Volume Three. Trans. Alastair 
Hamilton. London: Calder and Boyars, 1972. 65-67. Print. 
Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul. New York: Zone Books,1991. 
Print.  
Bordwell, David. Ozu and the Poetics of Cinema. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1994. Print. 
Burch, Noël. To the Distant Observer: Form and Meaning in the Japanese Cinema. Revised and Ed. 
Annette Michelson. London: Scolar Press, 1979. Print. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. 
London: Continuum, 2005. Print.  
---. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. London: Continuum, 
2005. Print.  
---. “Portrait of the Philosopher as a Moviegoer”. Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 
1975-1995. Ed. David Lapoujade. Trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina. New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2006. Print. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. What Is Philosophy? Trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh 
Tomlinson. New York: Verso, 1994. Print.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. London: 
Penguin, 1990. Print  
Spinoza, Benedict. “Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect”. The Collected Works of Spinoza: 
Volume 1. Ed. and Trans. Edwin Curley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Print.  
FORUM | ISSUE 18 Tyler Munroe Parks 10 
 
 
 
 
Author Biography  
Tyler Munroe Parks studied literature at the University of San Diego, and he completed a Master's in 
film studies at the University of Edinburgh, where he is now nearly finished with a PhD thesis 
entitled 'The Subtle Way Out: Cinematic Thought, Belief in the World, and Four Contemporary 
Filmmakers.' 
